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Is it complex environments or complex systems that undermines 
police reform in developing countries?  
Abstract 
 
This article is a reflection upon the challenges facing police reform in developing countries. In doing so it 
explores the usefulness of complexity theory both to understand the evidence of relative failure and to 
reconsider the explanations offered for that failure in terms of unique individual factors or the complex nature 
of the environment. The article suggests that the nature of police organisations as complex social systems may 
be a principal reason for failure. The article outlines some of the key features of complex systems and 
illustrates these from actual police reform. The article then turns to whether complexity theory can be of any 
practical use in police reform programmes. It concludes that greater success may be forthcoming if the insights 
of complexity theory are taken on board by reformers. 
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The struggles of police reform 
After many decades of substantial effort to reform police forces in the developing world, it 
seems appropriate to take stock and to review what has been achieved. This article is a 
reflection on the challenges that have been met and how they have been or might have 
been handled. Starting from the perspective that good state security institutions make good 
security for the people, the improvement of security in developing countries has focused for 
many decades on reforming states’ police institutions.  Donors have typically required those 
proposing police reform programmes to provide a theory of change (ToC) - an account of 
the underlying assumptions being made upon which the desired changes in the police 
organisation are promised and an ensuing log frame (logical framework) enunciating the 
interventions necessary to create the conditions that would achieve the objectives. Also 
expected have been the indicators that would evaluate the performance of the 
interventions (Anderson, 2005). The whole exercise has been based on a linear model of 
development, namely, produce the right causes and the desired effects will follow. Typical 
ToC assumptions are: build the capacity of central Security and Justice (S&J) institutions and 
there will be improvements in S&J services and increased public trust and state legitimacy; 
train police officers and there will be improved police attitudes and behaviour; provide 
services to female victims of crime and the incidence of violence against women will reduce; 
improve community-police relations and there will be an improvement in police 
responsiveness and crime reduction (ICAI, 2015, p. 12). 
 
Yet from the early 2000s growing concern was expressed about the limited success of police 
reform and hence the failure to provide all the desired security. Development was not 
following the linear log frame narrative. Call and Cousens spoke of efforts to build security 
institutions as not being ‘especially encouraging’ (2007, p.8-9). Englebert and Tull concluded 
that the results of the 10 UN peace operations in Africa, post-Cold War, to bring about state 
reconstruction, focusing on restoring the state’s monopoly over the means of coercion, had 
been ‘paltry’ (2008, p. 106) and that the efforts had often been ‘superficial and limited in 
their capacity to contribute to the restoration of lasting peace and security’ (2008, p.129). 
Despite large investment of resources, the World Bank admitted that: ‘the numerous rule of 
law assistance programs in post-conflict or fragile countries have so far resulted in few 
lasting consequences’ (Samuels 2006, p. 15). According to Ball and Hendrickson, much of 
the work in SSR [security sector reform] had been ‘misleadingly optimistic about the 
prospects for change’ (2006, p. 38).  
 
Deviations and complex environments 
The explanations given for the disappointment were in the 2000s apportioned widely. Alice 
Hills found reform in Nigeria, ‘to be superficial, localised and temporary’ (Hills 2008) and she 
blamed corruption and the internal politics of the Nigeria police that had meant that desired 
reforms had to be balanced by political realities.  Of the Mexico police, Daniel Sabat said 
there had been, ‘a wide gap between creating a formal policy and seeing it effectively 
institutionalized’ and he blamed corruption in the entire criminal justice system (2012, p. 
21). A report on the Afghan police reform concluded that, ‘despite seven years of 
international assistance, billions of dollars investment, and numerous reform programs, 
dividends have been little more than negligible’ (RUSI & FPRI 2009, p. 6). It blamed lack of 
political will, poor training, and a focus on numbers rather than quality, amongst other 
factors.  As regards Timor Leste, Ludovic Hood (2006, p. 143) claimed that the security 
sector reform had only ‘produced security services devoid of adequate institutional 
development and woefully lacking in any democratic oversight’. This he blamed on poor 
leadership, negligible planning and unqualified mentors. David Lewis, writing of OSCE Police 
reform programmes in Kyrgyzstan, Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan and Tajikistan, 
concluded that they had ‘clearly failed to achieve their objectives’ (2011, p. 103). He blamed 
lack of political will and ‘vested interests in the security forces that controlled lucrative 
systems of corruption and criminality’ (Ibid, p. 106). In Brazil an attempt was made in the 
early 2000s to introduce a form of community policing, known as GPAE—Special Area 
Policing Unit. In explaining why it had proved a ‘high-profile public disaster’, Denyer Willis 
and Mota Prado (2014, p. 237) pinpoint the lack of political support and the fact that the 
police had not been specially trained for the challenges of the favela residents.  
 
The finger of blame, then, for lack of success in police reform was pointed initially at 
different individual factors that were either unexpected or proved be less manageable than 
anticipated. Had the politicians backed the planned changes, had the police managers spent 
the money as directed, and had the police officers followed their training, then the 
programme would have been fulfilled. Essentially the programme design was fine; it simply 
had not been followed. Concerns about the effectiveness of police reform rarely questioned 
the typical SSR logistical framework that had been used for so many years, with its 
assumption that reform would follow training, equipment, improved management systems, 
accountability mechanisms and the introduction of professional standards units.  
 
A step forward in understanding failure in the reform of security institutions came with the 
World Bank Development report of 2011, Conflict, Security and Development. From security 
problems in a country being seen as requiring no more than the reform of security 
institutions, there was a shift to perceiving the security problems in countries as inherently 
complex (a point anticipated in part by Wolf, 2004). In Chapter 5 of the Report,  
‘Transforming institutions to deliver citizen security, justice, and jobs’, there is a recognition 
that reform is not straightforward because of the context in which it is taking place. Rather 
than explaining failure in terms of un-anticipated problems, it faced up to the fact that 
problems were inevitable, since reform programmes invariably took place in complex 
settings. The finger was pointed, not at individual factors, but on the complexity of the 
whole socio-political environment. It could be anticipated, especially in post-conflict 
countries, that there would be, simultaneously, civil institutions incapable of carrying out 
reforms; continued conflict; high levels of criminality by ex-combatants; ethnic division 
exacerbated by the conflict; lack of political will; and severe government budgetary 
constraints. This awareness meant, in the World Bank’s view, that programmes had to avoid 
being over-ambitious and had to be flexible. It also counselled that programmes had to 
undertake context analysis and broaden their scope to cover the complexity of the 
environment they were working in.  
 
What the World Bank did not question, however, was the appropriateness of the standard 
elements of reform programmes. The World Bank still believed that security institutions 
could achieve success following the regular menu, even in complex environments, as long as 
the reform programmes were flexible. The Report, for instance, speaks of the 
transformation of the Haiti National Police, supported by MINUSTAH. The list given of 
programme’s achievements is impressive. It is claimed that the force was ‘professionalized’; 
its morale ‘raised’; its officers vetted; women recruits were prioritised; the internal affairs 
unit was ‘strengthened and acted decisively in cases of wrongdoing’; officers were ‘properly 
equipped’ and ‘received regular salary payments’; the police uniform was changed ‘as a 
public symbol of the change in the police force’; management was ‘strengthened’; ‘more 
authority’ was delegated ‘to the field’; and administrative and support functions were 
‘enhanced’ (2011, p. 153). The implication was that all these achievements in Haiti were 
achievable anywhere provided that there is flexible use of the right procedures. Hence the 
conclusion is that, if a police service undertakes such ‘progress in basic functions’, then even 
the complex security and safety problems in a country can be tackled. It is presented as 
proof that ‘basic reforms’ can ‘improve citizen security’ (ibid). What the Report did not 
recognise, however, was that the very security institutions themselves that are called upon 
to confront complex problems, are themselves complex systems. The World Bank’s focus 
was on transforming security through the security institutions, not on how the security 
institutions themselves will be transformed.  
 
When Nicole Ball and Luc van de Goor (2013) surveyed security practitioners two years 
later, it became clear that the World Bank’s alert to complex problems in complex 
environments had been absorbed. ‘Many respondents underscored the importance of 
understanding local context, particularly the complex political relationships’ (Ibid, p. 23). 
And they reference as good examples of this, a Swiss SSR project in Nepal and a Dutch-
Burundi SSD programme. In the former, the project did not follow a strict programming 
approach, but rather sought to engage in debate with political parties and other key 
stakeholders in order to determine whether it would be possible to get SSR on the agenda. 
In the latter, the programme was being guided by a Memorandum of Understanding rather 
than a logframe, in other words, it was setting out priority needs as identified by the 
partners, and was concerning itself with whether the intervention was having the desired 
outcomes, not whether it was following the logframe. 
 
Three main issues were listed as important by the security advisers who spoke to Ball and 
van de Goor: ‘Understand local context at multiple levels: Whose security and access to 
justice will be affected by donor programming and how. Engage in an iterative process of 
programme development and implementation. Understand what interventions will be 
politically and fiscally sustainable’ (2013, p. 24). Again, as with the World Bank, there was 
the valuable reminder of the complexities of the post-conflict context and the recognition of 
the need for ‘a non-linear, flexible, iterative approach to programming’ (2013, p. 5). Yet 
nowhere was the very nature of security institutions as complex systems acknowledged. For 
Ball and van de Goor, the complexities lay largely outside the police and other security 
organisations. 
 
Only a handful of scholars have acknowledged that the police themselves constitute a major 
problem to reform. Thus Skogan, (2008), Hills (2008) and Collins, Marenin & Chin-Chih Chu 
(2016) speak of internal organisational resistance to US and Nigerian police reform, and 
reforms in general. Yet in my opinion they fail to appreciate the scale of the problem. 
Though examining the police organisations, they are focused on identifying individual 
problems, rather than the systemic problem. They do not conceptualise the problem faced 
as being that of a complex system. This I believe is a significant oversight. 
 
The aim of this article, therefore, is to consider whether police organisations are not 
complex social systems and to highlight particular insights of complexity theory that have a 
high degree of relevance to police reform. I will then reflect on whether complexity theory 
can be of any practical use in police reform programmes and whether greater success in 
police reform might not be forthcoming if the insights of complexity theory are taken on 
board. 
 
Complex systems 
Currently in police reform circles, as noted, the linear development expected of log frames 
is frequently questioned and the complexity of security problems and post-conflict contexts 
is recognised. However, there is not yet widespread acceptance about the complex reality of 
security organisations, such as the police, who are being relied upon to deliver the internal 
security in a complex environment (with the exception of Hughes, Hunt & Curth-Bibb, 2013).  
 
This oversight is important since the interpretation of the ‘reality’ of an organisation, just as 
the context, will never be complete, especially if it is by ‘outsiders’.  It is tempting to imagine 
that though police organisations may have different structures, policing work itself is similar 
and the values desired are universal. This seems to be the underlying assumption of Collins, 
Marenin and Chin-Chih Chu (2016, p. 73) who assert: ‘democratic and professional policing 
can be defined fairly easily and in a globally accepted manner, even as it occurs in different 
forms. The underlying principles are similar and have been argued and accepted for a long 
time’. Assured of a recipe for success, thoughtful writers like Wolf feel confident that, 
‘potentials in post-conflict societies, where peace accords have been signed and where 
possibly even the reduction and adjustment of security forces have been agreed, are very 
positive indeed. Generally speaking, in such countries there is also a strong will to accept 
external support for reorientation and reform’ (Wolf 2004, p. 7). His confidence is buoyed 
by the example of South Africa which, when he was writing in 2004, he believed 
demonstrated ‘the deep structural transformation of the security sector’ (Ibid), although he 
might have serious reservations in 2017. The assumptions of Collins et. al., Wolf and others, 
however, are in fact partial understandings and it is on the basis of such partial 
understandings that ‘purposeful action’ is designed to improve performance in perceived 
failing police organisations. Those purposeful actions will indeed impact the organisation 
and bring change, but they may not be the desired and expected change. The intervention 
will create a new situation, but one that will again be perceived incompletely. And so a new 
cycle of intervention takes place.  
 
Can a definitive problem with a definitive solution be found for a complex social system? 
From the emergence of complexity science in the 1960s (following work on systems theory, 
cybernetics and artificial intelligence), through its development in the fields of computing, 
ecological systems, chaos theory in the 1970s and 80s, to its more recent use in the social 
sciences (e.g. Morgan, 2005; Watson, 2006; Schneider & Johanes, 2007; Hughes, Hunt & 
Curth-Bibb, 2013; Baser & Morgan. 2008; Miskelly, Hoban & Vincent, 2009; Henderick, 2009; 
Miskelly, Hoban & Mowels, 2010; Jones, 2011; Körppen, Ropers & Gießmann, 2011) the 
answer has been negative. Those working in the field of complex adaptive systems doubt 
that transformative change of any institution or a part of it is really a matter of linear 
development; that the right inputs will ensure the desired outcomes. That they question 
logical frameworks is not because they question the need for logic; it is rather to say that 
when dealing with complex systems, it is logical not to be certain of the outcomes of 
interventions. System thinking questions whether the unexpected problems are due to the 
environment alone in which the institutions operate rather than due in large part to the 
institutions themselves. From a systems’ perspective, reformers have tended to treat the 
organisation that they are focused on as if it were little more than a machine that will 
produce outcomes provided it is given suitable inputs. Their alternative approach to 
reforming organisations is to think in terms of ‘systems’.  Systems thinking is based on the 
understanding that though reform may be concentrated on a specific part of an institution, 
no individual, organisation or institution can be understood in isolation. A system can only 
be understood by contemplating the whole, not any individual part of the pattern.  
Therefore, in their view, though a development programme may be concerned with what is 
happening in a particular unit or to a particular process, in fact, in a complex system, many 
other things are taking place across a wide front. 
 
Police organisations as complex social systems   
What are the implications of understanding a police organisation as a complex social 
system? It means that the consequences of interventions when a reform programme is 
introduced are likely to be multiple and widespread. To answer just how multiple and 
widespread, we have to consider complexity theory or at least some of its ideas and 
principles. Applied to development, complexity theory entails the understanding of a range 
of concepts. First, interconnectedness and interdependence of the elements within a system. 
Second complex adaptive agents and how people react to change around them. Third, 
emergence of unforeseen phenomena. Fourth, co-evolution of elements within the system, 
the one part feeding off the other. Fifth, feedback processes that set in motion either a 
positive or negative change process that moves through the system as a consequence of 
activity. Sixth, sensitivity to initial conditions and how those conditions arose. Finally, non-
linearity, that is that development may not be a simple cause and effect. In summary, 
systems thinking cautions against making complete or final claims about complex systems 
(Ramalingam and Jones, 2008). As H.L. Mencken said, ‘Explanations exist; they have existed 
for all time; there is always a well-known solution to every human problem — neat, 
plausible, and wrong’ (1917). 
 
In this article I highlight just three particular insights of complexity theory that appear to 
have a high degree of relevance to police reform, namely: interconnectedness; complex 
adaptive agents; and emergence.  
 
interconnectedness and interdependence  
All systems display interconnectedness. A system is complex when it is made up of multiple 
elements and processes which are constituted and influenced by other elements and 
processes within the system, as well as being shaped and influenced by the system itself. As 
the elements react, the whole system changes; as the whole system changes, elements 
react again. This interconnectedness leads to interdependence and promotes complex 
behaviour.  
 
What does interconnectedness and interdependence mean for a police organisation? It 
means that neither the individual units (e.g. CID, traffic, counter-narcotics, strategic 
planning) nor the system as a whole are autonomous. It meant that police across all units in 
the Sierra Leone police could use very few of the 800 donated vehicles after the civil war 
since the Vehicle Maintenance unit lacked personnel and finance (Baker 2005, p. 374). 
Individual units cannot undertake their work uninfluenced by those outside. Rather, 
individual units are part of a web of interconnectedness and interdependence, a web that 
includes the entire police organisation and reaches beyond. Individual police units influence 
one another, whilst external actors, both within and outside the criminal justice system, 
influence the police organisation and its units.  
 
For example, police behaviour may change as a result of training, but training cannot be 
treated in isolation within a complex social system. The training of one unit may be 
undermined by the performance of other units. In the case of the Democratic Republic of 
Congo (DRC), the unit that impacted training negatively was Salaries. Poor salaries or 
inconsistent payment undermined the motivation that officers needed to continue the good 
practice learned through training. A 2015 report says that though improved police practices 
took place as a result of training, motivation to continue was undermined. ‘There seems 
little prospect that they will continue good police practice and the abandonment of corrupt 
practices’ (DFID, 2015, p. 9). Similarly, despite initial positive response to training in Serbia, 
de-motivation of officers occurred. In this case it was due to Strategic Planning and its 
inadequate capacity development. According to a 2014 report, there was a ‘lack of sufficient 
management and institutional structures, or the absence of a developed legal/procedural 
framework to support such changes (such as in the areas of strategic planning, resource 
management, and operational procedures)’. As a result, ‘those who were taught new 
techniques could not utilize them’ (Groenewald and Peake, 2004, p.7). Positive results do 
not necessarily follow from training inserted within a system. Indeed, the evaluation by the 
Independent Commission for Aid Impact (ICAI) of UK police training programmes in the 
developing countries was that: ‘None of the programmes we reviewed has produced 
evidence that training – whether alone or in combination with other support – has resulted 
in overall improvements in police performance’ (ICAI, 2015, p. 25). 
 
The depth of interrelatedness and therefore of the obligation to respond to other elements 
in the system or the system as a whole, will vary according to the degree of 
interdependence (known as coupling). Hence what is loosely coupled will tend to be less 
responsive to changes induced by other elements or actors including reformers. 
Assumptions that criminal justice units working on the same task or case will respond 
effectively to requests from other national criminal justice institutions, may well be 
overestimated. For example, in Bosnia and Herzegovina it was found that there was little 
cooperation between the police forces, prosecutors and judges, due in part to, ‘the many 
rival police forces and the lack of legal protection for judges, prosecutors and witnesses’ 
(Osland, 2004, p. 555). Even in developed countries like Canada, legislators did not 
anticipate that changes in mental health institutions would have any consequences for the 
police. Yet when the decision was made to close mental health institutions as inappropriate 
for those with mental health issues, large numbers were left unsupported in the community 
and it was the police who were picking up the ensuing problems on the streets (Baker and 
Das 2017; p. 8-9) and some of these cases then had to be put in already overcrowded 
prisons.  
 
Interconnectedness and interdependence appears to be a feature of police organisations as 
it is of all complex systems. It should make reformers wary of interventions focused on a 
single unit in a police service. Individual units cannot be understood in isolation. Nor can 
they be subject to transformation and then reinserted back into the organisation without 
distorting the whole in some way. The same warning applies to interventions that treat the 
police as separate from society.   
 
complex adaptive agents  
The variable response of individuals to multiple pressures is why complexity theory speaks 
of ‘adaptive agents’. Certainly the fact that a police institution is made up of individual 
employees and that employees relate differently with each other and with their physical 
and socio-political environment, is something familiar to police reform. Police officers and 
their units are subject to multiple influences originating far beyond their unit. These may be 
political, as in many countries the government regards the police as ‘its own’, there to do its 
bidding. Take the harassment of the opposition in countries such Uganda (Amnesty 
International, 2015) and Ethiopia (Human Rights Watch, 2015) or the insertion of spyware 
into the mobile phones of investigative journalists in Mexico (New York Times, 2017) or the 
dropping of investigations into ‘sensitive’ cases as invariably happens with corruption cases 
brought by Nigeria’s Economic and Financial Crimes Commission against prominent political 
figures (Human Rights Watch, 2011). Individual politicians may be applying pressure for 
charges to be dropped, case files lost or for rivals to be probed. The concept that the police 
are servants of the citizens is by no means universal.  
 
Other external influences may be plainly criminal. There can be threats to individual police 
officers to avoid persons or areas; or bribes to gain their collaboration. It is not unknown for 
the police to work with drug gangs, to hire out their weapons or, out of fear, to turn a blind 
eye on criminal activity. For example, court cases concerning bank robberies in Kenya have 
established that many were ‘co-ordinated, planned and organized by some criminal police 
officers’ (Anassi, 2004, p. 30).  
 
More benignly, perhaps, the external influence on a police officer may be interpersonal. 
Every officer has family, friends, religious leaders, clan leaders and the like, expecting 
favours and calling for identity ties to trump the law. The combination of all these multiple 
influences can be regarded as culture and culture can be a stronger determinant of 
behaviour than training. For example, the Royal Solomon Islands Police staff sergeant had 
just received training from the Australian team in riot control, but when confronted with a 
potential riot he reverted to his cultural patterns of behaviour. No authoritative commands, 
no ‘drawing a line in the sand’.  Ignoring his trainer who was beside him, he sent a certain 
constable into the hostile crowd. His explanation? ‘He knows the people, he’s from their 
island, he can speak their dialect, or he knows who to speak to; he’s best to deal with it’. 
The potential riot was dissipated. The Solomon Island culture of negotiating in all 
circumstances trumped the training (Curth, 2014). 
 
The influence, on the other hand, may be economic. Underpaid and over-worked police are 
the norm in the world, and the pressure to make a living and reduce the work load will at 
times be stronger than the pressure to observe the rules and adopt the new initiatives. No 
wonder many police forces are notorious for their informal (and illegal) road tolls such as 
Zimbabwe (Newfarmer & Pierola, 2015: 105) and Nigeria (Human Rights Watch, 2010) and 
their resistance to new methods of working.  
 
It is into these daily competing pressures that reform programme training days have to be 
inserted regarding changes in the law, new police duties and ‘best practices’ from the West 
about gender awareness, terrorism and human rights. Police organisational complexities 
nullify simplistic views or linearity in development. Is it any wonder if the training isn’t 
always implemented fully? Is it any surprise that Alice Hills (2012) found in the Nigerian 
police force that a pragmatic filter operated? Training that was perceived as of practical use 
and that would make life easier, was often adopted. But training that was perceived as 
ideological and arising from an alien culture, was typically ignored. Nor are we surprised 
that Franzisca Zanker (2017: 179) found that in Liberia, ‘the blueprint of community policing 
(the policy that international and national actors sought to implement) was in fact 
legitimized and consequently understood in completely different ways amongst the same 
group of actors’ whether that group was the police or the community. They differed on 
what was community policing: was it local people supplementing the police or doing what 
the police could not do? They differed on who was the community police: was it primarily 
the police or ‘anybody that wants to protect life and property’? Even apparently effective 
training ‘wears off’ with exposure to work place realities. A review 2013 of police in DRC 
found that, ‘while 70% of police trained in community policing were initially positive about 
the approach, after one year this figure had fallen to 30%’ (UKSU, 2014, p. 8). Nor is this 
something confined to the developing world. Robin Haarr found that the positive attitudinal 
changes learned in the US training academy he surveyed ‘dissipated as police recruits 
proceed to their respective police agencies where they are assigned a field training officer 
and are exposed to the work environment and organizational culture’ (Haarr, 2001, p. 1).   
 
It is true that police behaviour can seem contradictory and irrational. Here an officer 
investigates; now in a similar case there is indifference. Here an officer charges a suspect; 
here with a similar offence it is passed over. Is this irrational? It may be unexpected to the 
reform programme managers, but it is rational. It demonstrates the careful weighing up in 
each situation of what is in the best interests of the officer. It demonstrates that the officer 
is operating under multiple influences from interconnected elements inside and outside the 
police organisation.  
 
The variable response of police officers to multiple pressures does indeed indicate ‘adaptive 
agents’. They are following adaptive strategies (self-organisation) and acting for their own 
purposes and from their own view of what the organisation needs. In the process of their 
selective adoption of training and directives they are, of course, affecting all those they 
interact with, who will in turn react selectively. The complexity terminology captures the 
fact that individuals are not passive objects to be reformed. They are variable and changing 
targets. They react to the system and to each other, and may make decisions and develop 
strategies (of resistance or endorsement) to influence other agents or the overall system.  A 
senior officer in the Brazilian Military police recounts how the commander of the Academy 
resisted initial government attempts to encourage the recruitment of homosexuals in the 
late 1990s, arguing that such ideas were ‘too fancy modern for the way things are 
here…such [people] must be expelled, there’s no place for this here’, and for three years he 
was able to prevail (Baker & Das 2017, p. 179). The inherent knowledge on which officers 
draw to analyse and respond to the system, develops over time. It is known as the emergent 
property of their experience and learning of that system over time. As we have seen, the 
process of receiving information and analysing it will necessarily be impacted by the agent’s 
mental framework – what they believe and how they construct knowledge.  So, in the case 
of pressure from criminal elements, the response of police officers will certainly in part be 
determined by their moral stance. Again, in the case of filtering out Western ideology, there 
is an evaluation of the new ideas against deeply held and widely respected contrary views 
(probably the views of their whole upbringing and their lifelong community) about, perhaps, 
the role of women or sexuality. In other words, the response of the agent is shaped by their 
socialising influences, whether communal, institutional or religious.    
 
If we are dealing with complex adaptive agents, responses can range from resistance to 
embracing change. It means command and control management will be less effective than 
management that focuses on facilitation and empowerment, and promoting ownership 
(Snowden & Boone, 2007; Cameron & Green, 2015).  
 
Emergence  
Typically, in a complex system, what emerges over time is the product of both the 
experience of individuals, whose new responses shape the system; and the system that 
shapes the individual behaviour. In South Africa the transition period of 1993-4 brought 
together in the new single police service white officers with black officers who had received 
a quality of education and training far inferior to white officers. Yet as both racial groups’ 
experience of the ‘system’ in and out of the police service has been different, so their 
contributions to the present shared leadership is different. The different backgrounds may 
be still ‘problematic to this day’ according to one Provincial Police Commissioner, but he 
also acknowledges that after interventions (and despite initial ‘severe resistance’) black 
officers were now finally making a positive contribution at the executive level. (Baker & Das 
2014, pp, 188, 190). Staying with the South African Police Service (SAPS), Faull (2016) 
describes another emergent feature that was not anticipated. He claims that the SAPS’ 
Performance Chart has shaped the police as crime fighters, downplaying, despite rhetoric to 
the contrary, regard for community relations. In fact, community relations are absent from 
the targets by which police are assessed and the ‘unintended consequences’ have been 
angry demonstrations about the failures of policing. In other words, the introduction of the 
Performance Chart, instead of producing effective, democratic policing, has pressured police 
into behaviours that have eroded community trust in and co-operation with police. The 
police responses have shaped the system even as the system has shaped their responses. 
 
The behaviour of the system as a whole can emerge, often unpredictably, from the 
interaction of the parts. As DeWolf and Holvoet explain, emergence in a complex social 
system has ‘two important characteristics: a global behaviour that arises from the 
interactions of the local parts; and that global behaviour cannot be traced back to the 
individual parts’ (2005, p. 5). It is the complex system’s propensity for emergence that 
ensures its unpredictability. The interaction of elements within the system produce any 
number of emergent properties; such properties influence elements; which in turn produce 
new emergent properties. There is then an ongoing dynamic interaction. It is these 
unknowns, influencing the emergence of other unknowns, which make the prediction of 
theories of change uncertain.  
 
Such emergence is something familiar in police reform programmes. Take the example of 
Central Asia. Substantial aid was provided to police and border guards to counter the transit 
of narcotics through the region. What in fact has developed is not the expected reduction of 
the narcotic trade. Rather it appears that it has been the strengthening of the monopoly of 
the big players, namely ‘groups close to the political leadership and key players in the 
security apparatus’ (Lewis, 2011, pp. 115-116). All that the international assistance 
programmes have done, in Lewis’ assessment, is ‘allow police and security forces to focus 
on smaller-scale drug traffickers that are not linked to the security forces or government 
officials’ (ibid). It has not reduced the volume of drugs passing through the region. 
 To take another example, The Liberian National Police’s (LNP) Educational Support Program 
from 2005, was designed to promote women’s access to or promotion within the police. It 
offered them fast track education that would qualify them for positions that they could not 
otherwise fill. Though it did boost both the number of women in the LNP and their 
promotion, it caused, not surprisingly, widespread resentment among men in and outside 
the force who were not given the same opportunity. What was not, however, anticipated 
were the problems that it would cause for the female beneficiaries of the programme.  
Though they obtained educational certificates, these high school equivalencies did not 
actually amount to much and when faced with promotion exams the incomers did not fare 
well. The result was the emergence, in effect, of a caste system, where the pre-existing 
women who did have high school or college degrees, looked down on those who didn’t. The 
newcomers were condemned to never doing more than patrol work, unable to compete 
with others in the force. And, in fact, they then become a liability to the organisation or else 
left (Bacon, 2012, p. 14). 
 
The concept of emergence challenges the fundamental assumptions of state-building, 
whether it be the institution of the police or any state ministry and agency. It means that 
transformation is not (or not just) the result of management from the top. It is the assembly 
of an order that emerges as a result of the interaction of elements and processes. Though 
‘global’ order is undoubtedly influenced by top down directives, it is largely something that 
emerges from local interactions. This should make those who plan police reform by the 
imposition of new processes and procedures wary of the certainty that the right inputs lead 
to the desired outputs. 
 
The insights of complexity theory presented here, though brief, suggest that not only are 
police institutions to be understood as complex social systems, but that this essential 
characteristic offers a coherent explanation (perhaps the principal one) for the persistent 
failure of police reform. 
 
Applying Complexity   
Complexity might explain why police reform is not effective, but does it offer any solutions? 
Does the uncertainty of intervening into complex social systems, such as the police, mean 
that nothing can be achieved; or at least not without unexpected and negative results within 
the police (and those in politics, business and civil society connected with them)? 
 
Though the uncertainty of interventions encourages modesty in ‘theories of change’, it does 
not demand despair and inactivity. What it does require is reflective practice that learns by 
doing and the sharing of that learning by all those within the system concerning the positive, 
negative and unexpected impact that interventions are having. Only then can interventions 
into complex systems begin to make some headway.   
 
An illustration, though not perfect, of learning by doing is that of the Police Pacifying Units 
(UPPs) in Rio de Janeiro, Brazil. Renewed outcries occurred in 2008 against the control of 
favelas in Rio by, in effect, protection rackets organised by drug gangs or the para-police 
militias that had sometimes replaced them (but were little better). As a result, the political 
decision was made to drive out the gangs and militias from specific areas by military force. 
The violent take overs, known as ‘occupations’, succeeded in driving out the gangs and 
militias, but it left the challenge of with what to replace the security vacuum. The police 
were ruled out as being widely discredited and held in low esteem for their abuses and 
corruption. Initially, following the first favela occupation, the Public Security Secretary did 
no more than establish what he called a new Community Police Post (Posto de Policiamento 
Comunitario). Apart from statements that this Posto was different and would be manned 
only by military police living in the favelas, the project was ill-defined. The politicians 
wanted an end of the illegal economies of the favelas and an establishment of peace and 
order, but did not know what form of policing was required to achieve that. Their lack of a 
defined development plan, however, did have the advantage of offering flexibility and the 
opportunity to experiment and learn by doing. In other words, it marked a very different 
approach to intervening into complex social systems, whether the favelas or the police 
themselves. The Security Secretary saw the intervention as a work in progress, as a 
laboratory’  (Denyer Willis and Prado, 2014, p. 236).  
 
Recognising the differences of all the favelas from the rest of the city and from one another 
(UPPs now occupy 264 of the 650 favelas), the training of the new police attempted to take 
into account the needs of each favela. There are those who argue that a new policing order 
has developed. Prado commends its attempt to create ‘a respectful dynamic between police 
officers and members of the community without creating institutional mechanisms of 
control by the community over the police force (Prado et al., 2012, p. 31). There are others, 
however, who say that the UPP police are backsliding into old police habits and have failed 
to build the new set of social services—health, education, and job training—that were 
meant to correct the traditionally absent or minimally present and poor-quality city service 
projects in the favelas (Fruhling, 2012; Wolff, 2017). 
 
The point of this extended illustration is not to exaggerate the successes of UPPs or to 
recommend the Rio policy per se, but to draw attention to the method of the reform. It 
seems to me that, for all its contested outcomes, the programme has attempted to follow 
processes that are important for all interventions into complex social systems.  
 
First, it was sensitive to the initial conditions. There was attention to the composition and 
history and past policing, not just of favelas in general, but of each individually. There was a 
willingness to be taught by those who lived there as to what was the policing context the 
project was moving into and how that context had arisen. It sought to avoid, as every 
intervention must, following a standard package of community policing, recognising the 
uniqueness of each complex social system that made up a favela. 
 
Second, the continuous monitoring of change was given a high priority. Though the UPP  
project may not have maintained this, it is an important reform principle to recognise that 
complex systems can produce unexpected outcomes following interventions. At least in part  
there was an attempt in Rio to closely monitor the changes as they happened across the  
system, making use of the primary stakeholders of an intervention to record those changes.  
It is undeniable that only with short feedback loops can planning adapt quickly.  
 
Third, the project was flexible. The intervention into the favelas and the police organisation 
was seen as an ongoing experiment that inevitably would have to be adapted as the results 
were recorded. The funding action was seen, in effect, as ‘seeding’ emergent action. The 
project followed an incremental capacity development in terms of content, 
institutionalisation and geographic spread. This surely is a better way when faced with 
complex systems. 
 
Fourth, the project, to a degree, stimulated self-organisation and the facilitation and 
empowerment of those involved. It eschewed command and control management. It 
allowed space for the intervention to have a life of their own. To the extent that It 
encouraged reflection and criticism by the citizens and police in the favelas it was a positive 
intervention.  
 
Some may see in the failings of the UPP evidence for anxieties that, as Henderick (2009, p. 
86) puts it: ‘complexity may be used as an excuse for poor planning, and implementation’. 
Further, they may question whether it is realistic to expect co-operation and co-ordination 
between different partners when they have different interests and are competing with one 
another for funding and status. Despite these challenges, however, I would argue that if 
police organisations are to be managed as complex evolving systems and their reform 
programmes are to be progressed, then there must be sensitivity to the initial conditions, 
the continuous monitoring of change, a flexible approach to projects and the 
encouragement of self-organisation.  
 
Conclusion 
Many might prefer the organisations they seek to transform in the developing world to be 
machine like, responding with some degree of certainty to the inputs determined in the 
linear programme. Unfortunately, that is not the case and programmes that seek to reform 
police institutions have to better match reality if they are to be more successful. There is 
real value, in my opinion, in going beyond understanding that complex environments 
undermine police reform in developing countries, to seeing that police organisations are 
complex social systems themselves and that this also undermines reform. Complexity theory 
offers a way of understanding the nature of that organisation and the processes that follow 
intervention in them. It provides not only a more comprehensive analysis of why success is 
often limited, but it also offers an alternative approach to linear logframes. Though such an 
approach requires a flexibility and detailed ongoing monitoring and evaluation that it is 
often hard to achieve in the real world of development, the end results could be 
substantially better than has been achieved before. Hendrick (2009, p. 87) summarises the 
benefits of such approach. He says that it offers potential for changes in at least three areas 
of police reform: first, how a police organisation in the developing world is analysed prior to 
a reform programme; second, how the programme or intervention is implemented; third, 
how interveners themselves perceive and respond to the unfolding developments 
(Hendrick, 2009, p. 87).  
 
This article has not attempted to outline a detailed programme of how to intervene in 
complex social systems. There is clearly more to be aware of (see Hendrick, 2009 on conflict 
resolution and Jones 2011 on development). Nevertheless an outline of the advantages of 
such a conceptual framework is discernible.  
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